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Non-technical Summary 
No matter how well resourced, innovation efforts are prone to failure. This paper investigates 
how the allocation of resources to product innovation projects allows firms to cope with this 
challenge. We assume that firms choose both the amount of financial resources devoted to 
innovation projects, and the number of projects. Based on data for almost 1,500 innovative firms 
from Germany, we test whether a policy of allocating resources to a broader range of innovation 
projects increases sales of new products. We analyze whether firms that allocate resources 
selectively by stopping projects with unfavorable prospects are more successful than non-
selective firms. In addition, we also consider the degree of uncertainty in the product market as a 
further mediating variable of resource allocation efficiency. 
We find that breadth in resource allocation increases innovation performance, more so than the 
amount of resources devoted to each project. The effect increases with novelty of the innovation 
output. We also show that the performance effect of breadth varies in different contexts. Firms 
can expect greater new product sales through breadth if they operate in uncertain market 
environments or if they allocate resources selectively.  
The paper shows that firms’ choice of resource allocation strategy impacts performance. We 
theorize how breadth can increase the chances of success, which is particularly important in 
uncertain markets, and how selectiveness can contain some of the disadvantages that come with 
breadth. A firm that follows a dual policy of resource allocation breadth and selectiveness is more 
flexible, dealing with innovation uncertainty more efficiently than its peers. 
   
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Innovationsprojekte können immer wieder scheitern, unabhängig davon, wie viel Ressourcen 
Unternehmen für sie bereitgestellt haben. In diesem Beitrag wird untersucht, wie Unternehmen 
durch die Art der Allokation von finanziellen Mitteln auf Produktinnovationsprojekte den 
Innovationserfolg erhöhen können. Dabei wird angenommen, dass Unternehmen sowohl die 
Höhe der für Innovationsprojekte verfügbaren Mittel als auch die Zahl der unterschiedlichen 
Projekte festlegen. Auf der Grundlage von Informationen zu annähernd 1.500 innovativen 
Unternehmen in Deutschland untersuchen wir, ob eine Strategie, die verfügbaren Ressource auf 
eine größere Zahl von Projekten zu verteilen, zu einem höheren Umsatz mit neuen Produkten 
führt. Des Weiteren wird analysiert, ob eine selektive Mittelallokation, bei der wenig 
aussichtsreiche Projekte eingestellt und die Mittel auf die aussichtsreicheren Projekte konzentriert 
werden, zu höheren Innovationserfolgen führt. Dabei wird auch der Einfluss der Unsicherheit auf 
dem Absatzmarkt des Unternehmens berücksichtigt. 
Die empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass eine Strategie der „Breite“, d.h. der Verfolgung von 
vielen Innovationsprojekten, eher erfolgversprechend ist als die Strategie, weniger Projekte mit 
einem hohen Mittelumfang auszustatten. Der positive Effekt der „Breite“ ist besonders stark, 
wenn der Neuheitsgrad der Produktinnovationen hoch ist. Eine Strategie der „Breite“ empfiehlt 
sich insbesondere in Produktmärkten, die durch eine hohe Unsicherheit wie z.B. große, 
unvorhersehbare Schwankungen der Nachfrage gekennzeichnet sind. Eine selektive 
Vorgehensweise erhöht ebenfalls den Innovationserfolg.  
Die Untersuchung belegt damit die wichtige Rolle der Art der Ressourcenallokation für den 
Erfolg von Produktinnovationsaktivitäten. Durch die Verfolgung viele unterschiedlicher Projekte 
können Unternehmen gerade unter unsicheren Marktbedingungen vermeiden, auf das falsche 
Pferd zu setzen. Die Vielfalt an Innovationsoptionen kompensiert dabei bei weitem den Umstand, 
dass das einzelne Projekt nur mit vergleichsweise geringen Mittel ausgestattet werden kann. 
Dabei scheint eine Kombination mit einer selektiven Innovationsstrategie, d.h. dem rechtzeitigen 
Einstellen von wenig aussichtsreichen Projekten, besondere zielführend zu sein. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In today’s fast-moving markets, new products are more likely to fail than succeed (Loch and 
Kavadias, 2007). Nonetheless, competitive dynamics require firms to invest in innovation, even 
if, at the start of product innovation projects, little is known about their commercial viability 
(Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Hauser, Tellis, and Griffin, 2006). Allocating scarce resources to 
uncertain innovation endeavors is thus a daunting task for many organizational decision-makers.  
In contrast to its managerial relevance, resource allocation strategy has scarcely featured in the 
research on innovation performance. Standard input-output models do not account for 
heterogeneity in resource allocation (cf. Crépon, Duguet, and Mairesse, 1998; Mairesse and 
Mohnen, 2002). The models’ principal input factor tends to be innovation expenditure, which 
conceals variations in how these resources are allocated. Pouring more money into bad projects, 
however, does not necessarily increase performance. 
In this paper, our aim is to test the effect of different resource allocation strategies on 
innovation performance. As resource allocation is a core activity for managers of innovations 
portfolios, this study adds to a growing body of literature that delineates how organizational 
differences in the strategic management of innovation impact performance (Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2006; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Leiponen and Helfat, 
2010, 2011; Li and Atuahene-Gima, 2001). 
One strategy that managers may adopt to cope with the lack of information about the 
commercial viability of innovation projects is that of maintaining flexibility in resource 
allocation. Conceptual models of the new product development process have long advocated 
partial resource allocation that allows firms to invest broadly initially and more selectively over 
time (Ding and Eliashberg, 2002; Klein and Meckling, 1958; Nelson, 1961; Roberts and 
Weitzman, 1981). An initially broad allocation of portfolio resources to various innovation 
projects spreads risks, and subsequent selectiveness in providing follow-on funding focuses 
scarce resources on the most promising projects. Innovation funnels - broad exploration followed 
by selective commercialization – are thus thought to outperform less flexible resource allocation 
methods, especially in uncertain markets. 
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Unfortunately, despite the plausibility of the theory, there is limited empirical evidence of the 
performance effect of flexible resource allocation. Empirical work in this area does not study 
innovation portfolios directly and often concentrates on breadth alone. Studies of product variety 
(Kekre and Srinivasan, 1990; Sorenson, 2000), for example, and research on breadth in firms’ 
search efforts (Laursen and Salter, 2006; Leiponen and Helfat, 2010) have tended to endorse 
greater breadth. But findings originating from qualitative studies of the new product development 
process, which suggest benefits to funnel-style resource allocation (e.g. Cooper, Edgett, and 
Kleinschmidt, 2001; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992), remain untested. Recent contributions also 
cast doubt over the efficiency of stage-gate processes for resource allocation (Sethi and Iqbal, 
2008). In an attempt to find anecdotal empirical evidence of both breadth and selectiveness, Ding 
and Eliashberg (2002) observe inconsistencies with their predicted funnel-model. The firms they 
observed tended to invest narrowly and avoid selecting out projects.  
The need for comparative empirical research on the effect that resource allocation flexibility 
has on innovation performance motivates our study. We use data from the German section of the 
EU-wide Community Innovation Survey (CIS). CIS data are appropriate because three direct 
measures of firms’ innovation performance are included: sales of new or improved products, 
sales of products that are new to the firm, and sales of products that are new to the market. We 
were fortunate in being able to append further questions to the questionnaire, capturing firms’ 
strategies for allocating resources to projects in their innovation portfolio.  
Results show that breadth has a significant positive direct impact on all three performance 
variables. The effect is strongest for new-to-market product sales, but it is context-dependent. In 
less uncertain environments, the breadth coefficient decreases and is less significant. Similarly, 
firms that do not allocate resources selectively do not see as strong a performance effect of 
breadth. Broad resource allocation is thus a more useful strategy for firms in uncertain markets 
and for those that allocate selectively. Interestingly, the performance impact of breadth is bigger 
and more significant than that of increased project investments.  
Our theoretical contribution lies in the delineation of how heterogeneity in firms’ resource 
allocation policies explains variance in performance outcomes. We theorize how resource 
allocation breadth leads to higher new product sales, and explain how this effect varies in the 
context of uncertainty. We also show that breadth is more advantageous when coupled with 
selectiveness. Spreading bets alone does not constitute flexibility, but coupled with selectiveness 
it does.  
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In what follows, we discuss extant literature and develop three hypotheses. We then detail our 
empirical approach, present results, and address limitations. We conclude with a discussion of 
implications for theory. 
THEORY 
The success of a firm’s suite of innovative activities is a function of the amount and quality of 
resources dedicated to the task. Variables consistently linked with innovation performance 
include innovation expenditure and human capital (Crépon et al., 1998; Mairesse and Mohnen, 
2002). Given that only a fraction of innovation efforts are successful (Hauser et al., 2006), 
however, the performance relationship is more complicated. Commercial uncertainty shortens the 
period within which managers, no matter how intelligent or well resourced they are, can 
confidently predict key determinants of innovation success, such as future customer preferences, 
technological standards, or competitive landscapes. Often, the time-to-market for new product 
developments exceeds this period (Griffin, 1997; Hauser et al., 2006). Therefore, when firms 
allocate scarce resources to chosen innovative endeavors, they run the risk of misjudging the 
prospects of success. Projects that initially look promising may ultimately fail, and projects that 
initially seem unconvincing may ultimately succeed. 
Firms’ innovation activities are often organized in portfolios of projects (Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1995; Hauser et al., 2006; Shane and Ulrich, 2004). For portfolio managers, the 
generation and selection of project variants is a prime concern (Loch and Kavadias, 2007). It is 
thus peculiar that the performance effect of heterogeneity in firms’ strategies to allocate resources 
to innovation projects has received conceptual attention (Ding and Eliashberg, 2002; Roberts and 
Weitzman, 1981) but limited empirical research. It is our objective to address this gap by testing 
for the impact of resource allocation breadth and selectiveness.  
Many firms operate an innovation process during which resource allocation decision-making 
is revisited at several points (Schmidt, Sarangee, and Montoya, 2009). These decision points 
allow for control over project resourcing, requests for which typically increase as projects move 
from one phase of the innovation process to the next. The decisions made at such points 
determine the breadth and selectiveness of resource allocation. By breadth, we mean the 
parallelization of innovation efforts, indicating a strategy of funding the start of several different 
innovation projects. Selectiveness refers to resource allocation decisions at later stages of 
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development projects, indicating a strategy of deliberate discrimination between projects that 
deserve further resource allocation and those that do not. Prior research suggests that firms 
display substantial variation in the degree to which they allocate innovation resources broadly 
and selectively (Cooper et al., 2001; Griffin, 1997; Hauser et al., 2006).  
In what follows, we develop three hypotheses about the relationship between firms’ resource 
allocation strategy and innovation performance. 
Resource Allocation Breadth 
One informative setting in which breadth has been researched empirically is that of product 
variety (for a review see Lancaster, 1990). Scholars articulate a positive relationship between 
variety and performance. Kekre and Srinavasan (1990) show that a broader set of new products 
increases the chances of fit between product characteristics and consumer preferences. As a 
result, greater product variety is associated with firms’ persistence in an industry (Sorenson, 
2000). One would expect a similar rationale at work during new product development, where 
resources are spread across a number of projects, covering various aspects of potential future 
customer preferences. The assumption is that a few extraordinary innovation successes outweigh 
the inevitable costs of producing many mediocre innovations. For example, Ding and Eliashberg 
(2002) report that Sony had pursued between 20 and 30 development projects in the area of 
videotape recorder technology, in order to increase chances of success in one of them. 
This performance logic is also employed with regard to breadth of search and objectives. More 
sources of innovation and a broader search pattern lead to better informed new product decisions 
(Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Leiponen and Helfat, 2010). The greater the 
number of different objectives associated with product innovation activities, the greater the 
predicted performance (Leiponen and Helfat, 2010).  
The above works suggest breadth increases the odds of success, and we hypothesize for 
innovation management: 
H1) Spreading resources broadly, i.e. across a greater number of development projects, 
increases product innovation performance. 
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Breadth and Uncertainty 
Scholars have also stressed disadvantages of breadth, proposing a u-shape relationship with 
performance as well as generally detrimental effects in particular contexts. For example, greater 
breadth in search may reduce managerial attention to a project, thus dcreasing output quality 
(Barnett, 2008; Laursen and Salter, 2006), although not all studies could replicate this 
countervailing effect (Leiponen and Helfat, 2010) or found it negligible (Kekre and Srinivasan, 
1990). Breadth in product innovation portfolios can also starve individual projects of sufficient 
resourcing, increase managerial complexity, reduce incentives, and hamper strategic focus and 
thrust generally (Ghemawat and Costa, 1993; Klingebiel, 2010; Sull, 2003).  
In view of these potential downsides, breadth might be more useful in some circumstances 
than in others. Uncertainty provides a context against which parallel search has been particularly 
emphasized (Klein and Meckling, 1958; Marschak and Nelson, 1962; Nelson, 1961). With 
decreasing managerial confidence in the performance outcomes of innovation projects, pursuing 
several avenues in parallel becomes more important to improve the odds of success. In a context 
of uncertainty, the positive aspects of breadth are thus more likely to outweigh its negative ones. 
For example, greater task uncertainty in public problem solution contests has been shown to 
increase the positive effect of parallel search relative to its detriments such as participant 
disincentives (Boudreau, Lacetera, and Lakhani, 2011). The logic of uncertainty offsetting 
potentially negative effects of breadth has also been invoked, though not empirically addressed, 
in the literature of product variety (e.g. Lancaster, 1990; Sorenson, 2000) and search efforts 
(Laursen and Salter, 2006; Leiponen and Helfat, 2010).  
It is thus timely to test for the conditioning effect of uncertainty on the relationship between 
resource allocation breadth in product innovation and performance. We suggest that market 
environments where managers have a reduced ability to predict new product success provide the 
context for a greater performance benefit of breadth. We hypothesize: 
H2) The effect of resource allocation breadth (H1) is greater in the context of 
uncertainty. 
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Breadth and Selectiveness 
The second context in which breadth stands to be more beneficial is one where resources are not 
fully committed and can be withdrawn from candidate products that seem less promising over 
time.  
The advantages of breadth derive from increasing the odds of including successful candidate 
products during initial project selection—when little is known about projects’ commercial 
viability and exploration is relatively affordable. But this advantage diminishes over time. At 
later stages of development, project resource requirements increase, and managers can typically 
construct a more informed opinion about a project’s commercial viability (Loch and Kavadias, 
2007). Breadth is thus comparatively less useful and more expensive to maintain for projects in 
later stages of development. If a firm’s broad innovation project lineup translates directly into a 
broad new product portfolio, it benefits from a higher likelihood of offering blockbuster products 
but also suffers from offering more lackluster products. 
The conjecture is that firms which allocate later-stage development resources selectively 
generate greater innovation performance. Selectiveness ensures that fewer lackluster products 
reach the market. Resources originally marked for the development of projects with deteriorating 
prospects can be used by more promising candidate projects, thus increasing the quality of the 
final output from these projects. The concept is one of efficient failure (McGrath, 1999). A new 
product development process with broad allocation of small initial funds, and selective allocation 
of more substantial funds as commercial uncertainty resolves, is expected to lead to greater 
performance than a process that allocates funds to a fixed number of projects (Ding and 
Eliashberg, 2002; Roberts and Weitzman, 1981). 
Taking advantage of experimenting broadly, while containing the disadvantages of breadth 
through selectiveness, is reflected in the concept of flexibility (Sanchez, 1993), which enables 
probing and learning without committing the organization to launching potentially disappointing 
products (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; McGrath, 1999; Sitkin, 1992). Spreading bets broadly 
and committing selectively is thus a more advantageous resource allocation strategy than breadth 
alone. In this paper, we aim to test whether broad resource allocation in the context of 
selectiveness generates greater performance than broad allocation in a context where firms do not 
select out. We hypothesize: 
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H3) The effect of resource allocation breadth (H1) is greater in the context of 
selectiveness. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample 
The data are drawn from the 2009 Mannheim Innovation Panel, which constitutes the German 
part of the European Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The German CIS is sponsored by the 
Federal Ministry of Education and Research and conducted in cooperation with the Institute for 
Applied Social Science Research, one of the largest market and poll research institutes in the 
country. CIS data have been used in countless economic articles and, more recently, attracted 
attention from the management community (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Grimpe and Kaiser, 
2010; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Leiponen and Helfat, 2010). The statistical agency of the 
European Commission, Eurostat, coordinates the survey instrument and, in close coordination 
with EU member states, produces a harmonized questionnaire applied in each country 
participating in the CIS exercise. Basic definitions and the survey methodology rest on the 
OECD’s document “The Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities, Proposed 
Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Technological Innovation Data,” also known as the 
Oslo Manual, which contains guidelines for collecting and interpreting innovation data (OECD & 
Eurostat, 2005). Reliability and validity of CIS data are supported by extensive piloting and pre-
testing.  
Questionnaire data are processed using semi-automated methods of data input. Each response 
is subject to comprehensive quality control, including a consistency check with responses by the 
same firm in earlier survey waves. Since the German CIS is conducted annually, and most firms 
participate regularly, survey respondents are familiar with the main concepts and definition of the 
survey and can rely on established accounting and reporting tools to provide the various data 
asked for in the questionnaire. 
Targeted at executive officers in charge of innovation, CIS’s main strength is the provision of 
direct measures of firm success in commercializing innovations, across a broad range of 
industries. These measures provide a powerful complement to traditional innovation measures of 
patenting activity. In the CIS data, a commercialized product innovation is defined as a novel or 
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significantly improved product or service introduced to the market. These are categorized as 
either new-to-market, new to a firm’s product portfolio, or improvements to the existing range of 
products. The 2009 survey wave contains information on innovation for the period 2006-2008. In 
addition to the normal set of items, the 2009 survey also contained specific questions about 
breadth and selectiveness, as described in the section on measures below. 
The gross target sample of the 2009 wave consists of 35,197 enterprises. The sample is 
stratified by sector (56 sectors at the two-digit level of NACE rev. 2.0), size class (eight classes 
according to the number of employees) and region (West Germany and East Germany). The 
sample firms were contacted via mail survey, with an option to respond online. Firms that did not 
respond within six weeks of being mailed the questionnaire received a telephone reminder and 
were sent another copy of the questionnaire. After another six weeks, a final reminder followed. 
The process rendered 5,388 firms classified as neutral losses: they could either not be contacted 
or were confirmed to have ceased operation. Out of the corrected gross sample of 29,807 
enterprises, 7,061 usable responses were received. The response rate of 25 percent is slightly 
below that of Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) and Laursen and Salter (2006) but of the usual 
magnitude for voluntary mail surveys in Germany (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010), particularly when 
considering the substantial length of the questionnaire. Sector and size composition of the net 
sample does not differ significantly from the gross sample, indicating that the net sample is 
representative in terms of the sector and size distribution of the German firm population.  
In order to control for a possible selection bias between responding and non-responding firms 
in terms of their innovation status, an extensive non-response survey was conducted, surveying 
4,829 enterprises by telephone. This survey revealed a higher share of innovating firms among 
the non-responding firms (63.1 percent) compared with the net sample of responding firms (54.3 
percent). This information is used to re-calculate weights for economic projections and policy 
analysis but is of limited concern for our study (Janz et al., 2001; Peters, 2008). 
For this paper, we use only a sub-sample of survey responses. We exclude 3,017 firms that did 
not conduct any product innovation activity during the observation period. Some 399 firms have 
fewer than 10 employees, the standard threshold for CIS analysis (Laursen and Salter, 2006; 
Leiponen and Helfat, 2010). We also drop 41 nascent firms that were founded only during the 
observation period. A total of 1,082 observations show missing values in at least one dimension 
of interest, resulting in a final data set of 1,495 firms. 
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Measures 
Dependent Variables: Performance in product innovation is conceptualized as the extent to which 
a firm generates commercially successful new products, evidenced through revenue from new 
product sales. To account for potential differences in the novelty of the new products generated, 
we adopt the customary categories: (a) sales originating from new-to-market products, (b) sales 
from new-to-the-firm products, and (c) sales from all new products and improved products. On 
average, 6 percent of our sample firms’ sales are attributed to new-to-market products (a), 10 
percent to new-to-firm products (b), and 25 percent to new and improved products (c). The 
operationalization and distribution of these variables are in line with prior CIS work (Laursen and 
Salter, 2006; Rammer, Czarnitzki, and Spielkamp, 2009). 
All three measures contain absolute values. They have the advantage of providing greater 
construct validity than ratios (e.g. new product sales/overall sales); a performance increase in 
absolute terms can be more directly interpreted as being related to a firm’s innovation activities 
than an increase in relative terms. An increase in a ratio can be due to a firm selling more 
successful new products as well to the firm selling less successful legacy products. Absolute 
figures for new product sales avoid this phenomenological conflation. In addition, ratios lead to 
extreme values for smaller firms, a problem that does not occur with absolute values (Mairesse 
and Mohnen, 2010).  
Independent Variables: We introduce a new variable for resource allocation breadth. As 
suggested in the literature on new product development (Ding and Eliashberg, 2002; Loch and 
Kavadias, 2007; Roberts and Weitzman, 1981), we asked CIS firms to report the number of 
innovation projects pursued during 2006-2008. Answers were then normalized with regard to 
firm size. This measure of breadth thus reflects the range of innovative efforts across which firms 
spread a standardized unit of innovation resources.  
Orthogonal to the breadth of the project portfolio is the amount of resources allocated per 
project. If a firm increases its overall innovation budget, it can afford either more projects or 
more resources per project. We operationalize project resourcing by dividing a firm’s overall 
innovation expenditure by the number of projects it pursued. By controlling for the level of 
project resourcing, it becomes possible to identify the separate performance effect of allocating 
resources to a broader range of projects.  
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As regards uncertainty, our theoretical interest is specifically in the extent to which managers 
can rely on available information to gauge the commercial prospects of future new products. For 
this purpose we operationalize uncertainty as the volatility of year-to-year industry sales (three-
digit level) over the period 2002-2007 (five years prior to the year for which innovation output is 
measured). These data are drawn from the value added tax statistics of the Federal Statistical 
Office of Germany. As a widely used, established measure (e.g. Agle et al., 2006; Beckman, 
Haunschild, and Damon, 2004) it allows us to investigate the effect of resource allocation breadth 
in two types of environments: a relatively unstable one where managers struggle to predict future 
new product sales, and a stable one where this is comparatively easier. 
Selectiveness refers to a firm’s policy of allocating resources discriminately as projects move 
through the innovation process. For our analysis, the objective is not to prescribe the optimal 
share of projects that should be pruned, chiefly because this varies within each firm and period. 
Instead, our goal is to capture whether firms apply any selection pressure at all. This is relatively 
easy to detect: selective firms differ from non-selective firms in that their project portfolio 
breadth diminishes over time (Adner, 2007; Ding and Eliashberg, 2002; Guler, 2007).  The 
survey thus asked whether or not a firm discontinued some of the innovation projects it pursued 
during 2006-2008. The responses provide us with two categories for the selectiveness variable: a 
firm that completes all its projects is not selective; a firm that completes only a subset is 
selective. In our sample, 40 percent of firms were selective. 
Control Variables: Our model contains controls that are frequently included in models 
explaining innovation performance (Crépon et al., 1998; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010; Leiponen and 
Helfat, 2010; Mairesse and Mohnen, 2002). We use firm sales to account for size, because larger 
firms generate greater new product sales in absolute terms, all else being equal. To control for the 
quality of input to the innovation process, we measure the proportion of employees with 
university degree. We further control for the degree to which firms carried out research and 
development on a continuous basis (yes/no). Whether firms were engaged in process innovation 
(yes/no) is also included as this is a valuable organizational activity that may influence our model 
focused on product innovations. One could also imagine variation in innovation performance that 
is due to firms’ experience, which is why we drew firm age information from the national 
registry. In addition, we control for variation in performance that may be due to the focal firm 
belonging to a mother group of companies. Finally, we include a set of 22 industry dummy 
variables representing groups of two-digit level NACE sectors. This is to control for potential 
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industry-level variations in firms’ capacity to generate innovation performance. Tables 1 and 2 
show descriptive statistics for our main model variables. 
---- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 here – Descriptives & Correlations 
---- 
Estimation 
Our data are censored, making Tobit analysis the estimation method of choice. We follow 
established designs for innovation performance models based on CIS (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010; 
Laursen and Salter, 2006; Leiponen and Helfat, 2010). We depart from this only in that we 
decompose the usual innovation expenditure variable into portfolio breadth and project 
expenditure. Hypotheses II and III are tested through comparative split-sample analysis 
(Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Terwiesch and Loch, 1999). As 
we hypothesize uncertainty and selectiveness to be contextual variables, we divide our sample 
into respective subsets. We thus dichotomize our measure of uncertainty, with those firms falling 
below the 40 percentile classified as in relatively stable market environments and those falling 
above the 60 percentile classified as in relatively unstable environments. We did the same for 
selectiveness, splitting respondents into a group that did not discontinue any projects and one that 
did.  
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the split samples. Two distributions are noteworthy. 
The first is that firms in low-uncertainty environments invest less in innovation than their peers. 
This is consistent with the logic that greater uncertainty requires a greater effort to achieve 
comparable returns. The second is that selective firms tend to be bigger, and thus have more 
projects (but not greater breadth, as breadth is sales-normalized), than non-selective firms. This is 
probably due to our operationalization of selectiveness; firms with bigger portfolios are more 
likely to discontinue at least one of their projects. We address this limitation and present 
robustness checks in the section below the results. 
All models use logarithmic transformations of the dependent variable. Innovation performance 
is strongly skewed in all three categories and, accordingly, the pattern observed in the empirical 
distribution is more fairly represented by lognormal distributions (for a detailed discussion, see 
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Laursen and Salter, 2006). Similarly, the controls for firm size and innovation expenditure are 
also imputed in lognormal form. 
We assume a partial lag between resource allocation and innovation performance by relating 
new product sales in 2008 to independent variables measured for the period 2006-2008. While 
there appears to be no consensus on the lag structure of innovation input and output (cf. Mairesse 
and Mohnen, 2010), we ensured that our operationalization is in line with that of prior CIS 
studies (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010; Laursen and Salter, 2006). In 
addition, we compared the results of two base models (cf. Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010), one 
including 2009 values and one including 2010 values. The 2010 model, with greater lag, 
explained 15 percent less variance than the 2009 model. 
Results 
Table 3 reports estimated marginal effects on the three dependent variables in full-sample 
models. Using the recommended design (Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010), our Reference Model 
shows significance for size, innovation expenditure, continuous R&D, and process innovation. 
These observations reflect are consistent with recent CIS studies (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010; 
Laursen and Salter, 2006; Leiponen and Helfat, 2010). From new product sales, through new-to-
firm product sales, to new-to-market product sales, the quality of resources becomes more 
significant. The coefficient of innovation expenditure and that of continuous R&D also increase 
with greater novelty of products sold. These changes across dependent variables are theoretically 
plausible as they indicate the greater challenges of generating truly novel product innovations. 
McFadden R2 values for the reference models are consistent with prior CIS work (Laursen and 
Salter, 2006).  
The next results reported refer to the Base Model, which tests for the direct effect of resource 
allocation breadth. Here, innovation expenditure is entered on a per-project basis to separate its 
effect from breadth. The results for the control variables are in line with the reference model. The 
effect of breadth on innovation performance is positive significant, increasingly so with greater 
novelty of products sold. This effect is consistent across all further models and supports H1. An 
interesting side observation in the Base Model is that the effect of innovation expenditure per 
project is insignificant and switches its sign with greater novelty of products sold. This picture 
does not change as the two contextual variables are added to the model (Full Model). Coefficients 
for the control variables, project breadth and expenditure hardly change. While we treat this 
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empirical observation with caution, it suggests that the effect of overall innovation expenditure is 
mainly driven by the breadth of the project portfolio rather than by the magnitude of project 
investments.  
---- 
Insert Table 3 here – Full Sample Models 
---- 
The Full Model shows no direct influence of uncertainty and selectiveness on innovation 
success, which is consistent with our theoretical argument that it is a contextual factor. 
Selectiveness does appear to also have a direct influence that is significant. We turn to the 
contextual influence of uncertainty and selectiveness in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 displays the 
results of the split-sample models used to test for the effect of breadth in the context of low and 
high uncertainty. The effect of breadth is positive significant in both contexts, but the confidence 
level and the magnitude of the coefficient are greater in the high-uncertainty context.  
To test whether the variation in coefficient values is statistically significant we computed the 
Z-score (Clogg, Petkova, and Haritou, 1995). For new product sales, new-to-firm product sales, 
and new-to-market product sales, the Z-score is significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent level for 
new product sales and new-to-market product sales, respectively. We further examined whether 
the assumption of two separate regression models is correct, using the Chow test methodology 
(Chow, 1960). Results confirm this assumption at the 0.1 percent-level for all three categories. It 
suggests that, across the two sub-samples, firms vary significantly in their capacity to generate 
innovation performance. In sum, the results of the uncertainty-split models support H2 
In the split-sample models, as in the previous models, the coefficient of breadth increases with 
novelty of product sales. As previously observed, the effect of project expenditure is weak. The 
control variables show effects similar to the prior models, with the slight exception of age, the 
effect of which becomes positive in high-uncertainty environments, suggesting benefits to 
experience (low significance level). 
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---- 
Insert Table 4 here – Split-Sample Models: Uncertainty 
---- 
Table 5 shows the results of the split-sample models used to test for the effect of breadth under 
the context of selectiveness and non-selectiveness. Both selective and non-selective firms see a 
significant positive performance effect of breadth, but the confidence level and the magnitude of 
the coefficient are greater for selective firms. The Z-Scores are significant at the .1 percent-level 
for all performance categories, lending strong support to H3. Chow tests render significance of .1 
percent, 13 percent, and 10 percent for new product sales, new-to-firm sales, and new-to-market 
sales, respectively. It suggests that selective and non-selective firms vary significantly in their 
capacity to generate innovation performance.  
The effects of the control variables in the split-sample models of Table 5 are broadly 
consistent with those of the full-sample models. The quality of resources becomes more 
significant with greater novelty of product sales. Whether or not a firm is part of a larger group of 
firms appears to matter more for selective firms, suggesting that not being able to make 
completely independent decisions is a disadvantage for selective firms. Innovation expenditure 
per project shows only a weak influence on performance.  
---- 
Insert Table 5 here – Split-Sample Models: Selectiveness 
---- 
Robustness, Sensitivity, and Limitations 
Interpreting changes in absolute values for the dependent variables in our models provides 
greater validity than focusing on ratios, but it comes with the disadvantage of having to include 
size as a control which then explains a substantial portion of the overall variance. To check for 
multicollinearity, we inspected the variance inflation factors of uncensored models. For the main 
independent variables, variance inflation factors do not exceed 1.7, which alleviates concerns of 
multicollinearity. To further check for model distortions through size, we reviewed semi-partial 
correlations. For the input variables reported as significant in the models above, semi-partial 
correlation values range from 0.05 to 0.22, while those of size range between 0.19 and 0.34. 
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These figures confirm that the independent variables explain non-trivial portions of the overall 
model variance (Budescu, 1993). 
We then ran our model designs again, this time with ratios as dependent variables. Dividing 
new product sales by overall sales reduces the influence of size as a control variable. Results of 
the ratio models were consistent with those reported above, suggesting that hypothesized effects 
of breadth are independent of size (Kleinknecht, Van Montfort, and Brouwer, 2002). The effect is 
strong enough to show even though ratios as dependent variables are influenced by more causal 
factors than absolute values. 
Bigger firms with bigger project portfolios are also more likely than smaller firms to select out 
at least one of their projects. We thus examined whether the way we constructed the selectiveness 
subsamples is robust to perturbations. Instead of by general selectiveness, we dichotomized the 
sample by whether firms pruned their portfolio to an extent above or below a threshold, e.g. 20%. 
This is a theoretically inferior operationalization and also causes greater imbalance in subsample 
sizes. But for this measure too, the result of breadth’s greater performance for selective firms 
holds. By contrast, a comparison of samples split into larger and smaller firms does not show 
significant differences in the effect of breadth. We then also checked if our dichotomization of 
low and high uncertainty is robust to perturbations. Alternative sample splits at the median 
(which reduces discriminant validity) and at 30/70 percentiles (which reduces the subsample 
sizes) rendered model results consistent with those reported above.  
The research design is relatively robust against reverse causality. There is no obvious reason 
to suspect higher-performing firms of allocating resources more broadly. Nevertheless, we ran a 
reverse regression model, for a subset of firms for which pre-observation period performance 
data are available. We find no statistical significance for the effect of innovation performance on 
subsequent portfolio breadth. 
Our work suffers from the usual abstractions and assumptions in econometric models and 
would benefit from future research. Interesting firm-level differences include the quality of ideas 
that are fed into the innovation process, an aspect for which we cannot currently control. 
Industry-level differences in innovation routines, the nature of innovation projects, or returns to 
innovation efforts are currently accounted for only through a series of industry dummies. Future 
research may be able to measure some of these differences more directly. Conversely, single-
industry contexts may offer the opportunity to study in more detail the causal chain between 
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portfolio resource allocation breadth and performance. Such studies may be able to identify 
various sources of innovation uncertainty and trace the reasoning for project discontinuations, 
both of which could moderate the relationships we propose. 
DISCUSSION 
Increasing the quality and quantity of innovation resources is not a sufficient answer to the 
challenge posed by commercial uncertainty inherent in most of today’s innovation projects. A 
firm’s performance in innovation also depends on how it allocates the available resources. By 
showing this empirically, this research deepens understandings of the determinants of product 
innovation performance. Our model results indicate that, when firms’ overall innovation 
expenditure is separated into resource allocation breadth and project resourcing, breadth 
significantly impacts performance, independent of resourcing. This effect is stronger for firms in 
high-uncertainty environments and for those that allocate resources selectively in later stages of 
the product innovation process. As discussed below, these findings have implications for theory 
of organizational resource allocation and innovation management. 
Resource Allocation Breadth and Innovation Performance 
We find evidence of a positive relationship between innovation performance and the allocation of 
resources across a broader range of innovation projects. Because managers have to commit 
resources before the performance implications of these commitments are fully understood, 
scholars have argued conceptually that greater breadth increases a firm’s chance of success (Ding 
and Eliashberg, 2002; Klein and Meckling, 1958; Marschak and Nelson, 1962; Nelson, 1961; 
Roberts and Weitzman, 1981). We add to these previous conceptualizations the first empirical 
support for the conjecture that greater resource allocation breadth increases innovation 
performance.  
The effect is positive significant for all three categories of innovative output: new product 
sales, new-to-firm product sales, or new-to-market product sales. The effect is greatest for the 
latter: the more novel the new product output, the greater the performance contribution of 
resource allocation breadth. Our interpretation is that greater novelty means that managers have 
fewer sources of information about a new product’s commercial viability to rely on when making 
initial resource allocation decisions. Therefore, greater novelty increases the benefit that firms 
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gain from a broad resources allocation strategy, improving their chances of satisfying future 
customer preferences that are not fully known in the early stages of new product development. 
In our models, breadth also proves a more significant predictor of a firm’s capacity to come up 
with a new-to-market product than the magnitude of resource investment, a key variable in 
economic models (Crépon et al., 1998; Mairesse and Mohnen, 2002). When separating overall 
innovation resourcing into the breadth and intensity of resource allocation, the results indicate 
that spreading resources across a greater number of projects is more important than increasing 
project resourcing. An innovation manager might thus be advised to err on the side of spreading 
resources too thinly, rather than concentrating substantial resources on an insufficient number of 
new product candidates. Our finding suggests that innovation is about getting the right new 
products at least as much as it is about getting new products right. 
The paper extends the literature on the strategic management of innovation by delineating 
resource allocation breadth as a predictor of innovation performance. But the underlying 
mechanism may apply more widely. Breadth spreads a firm’s commercial bets and makes it more 
likely that at least some investments will turn out to be successful, a mechanism that could also 
explain prior findings in adjacent fields, namely in the areas of product variety (Bordley, 2003; 
Lancaster, 1990; Sorenson, 2000) and search breadth (Laursen and Salter, 2006; Leiponen and 
Helfat, 2010). 
Effect Heterogeneity: Uncertainty 
While we observe a generally positive relationship between breadth and performance, we also 
show that this effect is not uniform across firms. There is a significant difference in the extent to 
which firms in less and more uncertain environments benefit from greater breadth. This 
difference exists within all three performance categories. 
Breadth increases a firm’s odds of success, but the degree to which this is the case is 
contingent on uncertainty. Firms in less uncertain markets can rely more on historic information 
than firms in more uncertain markets. The former are thus less likely than the latter to misjudge 
the commercial prospects of an innovation project in the early stages of development. As a result, 
firms operating in less uncertain markets have less to gain from breadth than firms in more 
uncertain markets.  
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The difference in effect between the two contexts of low and high uncertainty also suggests 
that breadth may carry disadvantages. Research indicates that these could include lack of 
strategic focus and diseconomies of scale (Ghemawat and Costa, 1993; Klingebiel, 2010). 
Another downside of breadth is that project managers’ motivation may decrease if more of them 
compete for innovation resources (Garcia and Tor, 2009). Although we are unable to trace 
specifically the ways in which breadth could be detrimental, our results indicate that any potential 
disadvantages of breadth are proportionately more offset by the advantages in a context of greater 
uncertainty. If uncertainty is low, the probability of investing in a doomed innovation project is 
smaller and the benefits of commitment to a focused path of action may outweigh the benefits of 
breadth. This interpretation is consistent with a recent study of innovation tournaments where the 
motivational disadvantages of higher numbers of participants were less problematic when 
uncertainty was high (Boudreau et al., 2011). 
The theoretical conjecture thus is that a strategy of broad resource allocation is a more 
worthwhile pursuit in some circumstances than others. By identifying uncertainty as a key 
contingent of the performance effect of breadth, the paper provides some explanation for why 
prior studies adjacent fields have suggested that the effect of product variety, for example, is not 
unequivocally positive (Bordley, 2003; Sorenson, 2000). It may also help explain the 
curvilinearity posited in studies on the breadth of firms’ search activities (Laursen and Salter, 
2006). 
Effect Heterogeneity: Selectiveness 
We also find a significant difference in the extent to which selective and non-selective firms 
benefit from greater breadth. The effect of breadth on all three categories of new product sales is 
greater if firms exert selectiveness in resource allocation over time. In addition, the direct effect 
of selectiveness is also positive significant. 
The direct effect indicates that pruning projects from an innovation portfolio increases 
innovation performance. Our interpretation is that managers, reacting to information that emerges 
during new product development, select out projects with declining commercial propensity. As a 
result, selective firms launch fewer lackluster products. They can also reallocate resources to 
more promising projects in the portfolio. This focuses innovation resources and stands to benefit 
the output quality and development speed of these projects, which we ultimately see reflected in 
higher performance. 
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As regards the conditioning effect of selectiveness on the performance effect of breadth, we 
theorize that pruning the project portfolio over time mitigates the disadvantages of greater 
resource allocation breadth (while maintaining its advantages). Selectiveness makes pursuing a 
broad resource allocation strategy more economical, due to two dynamics: resource needs are 
lower for early-stage development projects than for later-stage projects, and commercial viability 
is less clear for early-stage projects than for later-stage projects (cf. Hauser et al., 2006; Loch and 
Kavadias, 2007). It thus makes sense to allocate resources broadly in the early stages of the 
development process, while being more selective in later stages. It allows for greater exploration 
when projects’ commercial viability is still unclear, and for more focus when commercial 
viability is better established. High performers in innovation thus combine resource allocation 
breadth with selectiveness.  
We therefore contribute an explanation for performance differentials that are rooted in firms’ 
strategies for allocating resources within innovation portfolios. This insight connects with 
broader conceptualizations of strategic responsiveness. Where uncertainty cannot be reduced ex-
ante, efficient adaptation mechanisms are thought to influence performance, be they 
conceptualized as low-cost probes (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997), learning through failure 
(McGrath, 1999; Sitkin, 1992), or flexibility (Sanchez, 1995). Innovation portfolio management 
provides an exemplary setting where competitive pressure requires resource allocation before 
outcomes are fully understood. Resource allocation breadth, coupled with selectiveness, provides 
a mechanism for coping with this challenge - one that constitutes responsiveness and 
distinguishes high performers. 
These findings resonate with initial conceptualizations (Klein and Meckling, 1958; Marschak 
and Nelson, 1962; Nelson, 1961) and qualitative research on funnel-style innovation management 
(Cooper et al., 2001; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). With breadth and selectiveness being key 
features of resource allocation funnels, our paper suggests that firms employing funnels 
outperform those that do not. At the same time, our findings run counter to a recent study 
suggesting disadvantages to stage-gate funnels (Sethi and Iqbal, 2008). Interestingly, we also find 
that breadth and selectiveness are particularly important for innovation performance resulting 
from new-to-market products. This provides an alternative view to the notion that funnels, based 
on a (potentially inert) set of decision criteria, discriminate against radical innovations and thus 
hurt performance in this area (Hauser et al., 2006). In fact, our results suggest that the likelihood 
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of any new idea becoming a successful new-to-market innovation may be so low that breadth 
plus selectiveness are necessary mechanisms to generate more successful novel products. 
CONCLUSION 
No matter how well resourced, innovation efforts are prone to failure. We thus set out to 
investigate how the allocation of resources to product innovation projects allows firms to cope 
with this challenge. We find that breadth in resource allocation increases innovation performance, 
more so than resource allocation intensity. The effect increases with novelty of the innovation 
output. We also show that the performance effect of breadth varies in different contexts. Firms 
can expect greater new product sales through breadth if they operate in uncertain market 
environments or if they allocate resources selectively. It also appears that increasing innovation 
expenditure per project has a weaker link to performance than increasing resource allocation 
breadth.  
We contribute to explaining innovation performance differentials. Firms’ choice of resource 
allocation strategy impacts performance. We theorize how breadth can increase the chances of 
success, which is particularly important in uncertain markets, and how selectiveness can contain 
some of the disadvantages that come with breadth. A firm that follows a dual policy of resource 
allocation breadth and selectiveness is more flexible, dealing with innovation uncertainty more 
efficiently than its peers. 
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TABLES 
  TABLE 1: SPLIT SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVES
Variable  Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
New Product Sales (2008 €m) All 1,484 2.036 13.477 0 363.580
 Low uncertainty 611 1.462 9.453 0 206.119
 High uncertainty 593 1.722 7.855 0 123.280
 No Selectiveness 950 0.950 5.444 0 123.280
 Selectiveness 534 3.963 21.116 0 363.580
New-to-Firm Product Sales (2008 €m) All 1,484 0.683 5.310 0 151.126
 Low uncertainty 611 0.486 4.214 0 96.997
 High uncertainty 593 0.511 2.337 0 33.567
 No Selectiveness 950 0.227 1.033 0 17.388
 Selectiveness 534 1.492 8.682 0 151.126
New-to-Market Product Sales (2008 €m) All 1,484 0.536 5.107 0 151.126
 Low uncertainty 611 0.374 4.140 0 96.997
 High uncertainty 593 0.366 1.991 0 28.560
 No Selectiveness 950 0.143 0.697 0 10.787
 Selectiveness 534 1.234 8.413 0 151.126
Firm Size (avg 2006-2008, sales in €m) All 1,484 156.590 781.561 0.206 17012.520
 Low uncertainty 611 82.470 324.257 0.264 4281.346
 High uncertainty 593 132.799 444.331 0.206 4446.395
 No Selectiveness 950 76.451 301.541 0.206 4281.346
 Selectiveness 534 299.160 1227.138 0.370 17012.520
Resource Quality (2008, % staff w/ degree) All 1,484 0.233 0.240 0 1
 Low uncertainty 611 0.199 0.220 0 1
 High uncertainty 593 0.267 0.252 0 1
 No Selectiveness 950 0.237 0.246 0 1
 Selectiveness 534 0.228 0.232 0 1
Process Innovation (2006-2008, yes/no) All 1,484 0.611 0.487 0 1
 Low uncertainty 611 0.616 0.487 0 1
 High uncertainty 593 0.601 0.490 0 1
 No Selectiveness 950 0.582 0.493 0 1
 Selectiveness 534 0.662 0.473 0 1
Continuous R&D (2006-2008, yes/no) All 1,484 0.566 0.496 0 1
 Low uncertainty 611 0.484 0.500 0 1
 High uncertainty 593 0.616 0.486 0 1
 No Selectiveness 950 0.501 0.500 0 1
 Selectiveness 534 0.682 0.466 0 1
Firm Age (years, in 2008) All 1,484 33.526 40.316 4 509
 Low uncertainty 611 33.760 40.028 4 467
 High uncertainty 593 31.813 40.051 4 509
 No Selectiveness 950 30.711 37.924 4 467
 Selectiveness 534 38.519 43.835 4 509
Part of Group (2008, yes/no) All 1,484 0.431 0.495 0 1
 Low uncertainty 611 0.413 0.492 0 1
 High uncertainty 593 0.424 0.494 0 1
 No Selectiveness 950 0.354 0.478 0 1
 Selectiveness 534 0.569 0.496 0 1
Innovation Expenditure (avg 2006-2008,  All 1,484 0.075 0.444 0.001 0.879
for portfolio, % of sales) Low uncertainty 611 0.044 0.080 0.001 0.663
 High uncertainty 593 0.104 0.490 0.001 0.879
 No Selectiveness 950 0.072 0.407 0.001 0.727
 Selectiveness 534 0.079 0.504 0.001 0.879
Innovation Expenditure (avg 2006-2008,  All 1,484 0.817 2.960 0.001 58.016
€m/project) Low uncertainty 611 0.619 1.918 0.001 23.400
 High uncertainty 593 1.040 3.957 0.001 58.016
 No Selectiveness 950 0.793 2.598 0.001 37.500
 Selectiveness 534 0.859 3.514 0.001 58.016
Resource Allocation Breadth (2006-2008,  All 1,484 15.932 53.000 1 800
# of projects) Low uncertainty 611 13.291 46.736 1 720
 High uncertainty 593 15.001 44.476 1 800
 No Selectiveness 950 10.333 46.330 1 800
 Selectiveness 534 25.862 61.931 1 800
Commercial Uncertainty (2002-2007,  industry All 1,484 9.271 13.057 1.552 91.187
sales volatility, 3-digit level) Low uncertainty 611 3.905 1.045 1.552 5.442
 High uncertainty 593 16.143 18.520 7.471 91.187
 No Selectiveness 950 8.693 12.012 1.552 91.187
 Selectiveness 534 10.297 14.686 1.552 91.187
Selectiveness (2006-2008, yes/no) All 1,484 0.361 0.480 0 1
 Low uncertainty 611 0.330 0.471 0 1
 High uncertainty 593 0.367 0.481 0 1
 No Selectiveness 950 0 0 0 0
 Selectiveness 534 1 0 1 1
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TABLE 2: CORRELATIONS 
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TABLE 3: FULL SAMPLE MODELS
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TABLE 4: SPLIT-SAMPLE MODELS: UNCERTAINTY 
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TABLE 5: SPLIT-SAMPLE MODELS: SELECTIVENESS  
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